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Abstract. The Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model is a novel way of delivering 
software applications. In this paper, we present an analytical model to study the 
competition between the SaaS and the traditional COTS (Commercial off-the-
shelf) software. The main research goal is to analyze the pricing strategy of the 
SaaS in a competitive setting. The model captures the most salient differences 
between the SaaS and COTS, including their distinct pricing structures, user ini-
tial setup costs, system customization levels, and delivery channels. We find 
that the two could coexist in a competitive market in the long run, and more 
importantly, we show how the SaaS could gradually take over the whole market 
even when its quality is inferior. Surprisingly, our analysis shows that the SaaS 
should raise (reduce) its prices when its software quality declines (increases) 
over time (in the relative sense).  
Keywords: the SaaS business model; pricing strategy; competition; the COTS 
software.  
1   Introduction 
The Internet has enabled a new business model for software providers: the Software-
As-A-Service (SaaS) model. The providers could bundle software applications, an IT 
infrastructure, and all necessary support services and deliver them to users across a 
network when users have a demand for them. Meanwhile, the providers should store 
the software system and users’ data in a central location and are in charge of daily 
software maintenance, data backups, software upgrades, and security management. 
Hence, users obtain and pay for the final computing utility on demand. Such a  
business arrangement is totally different from the conventional delivery model for 
software applications. Traditionally, most software has been delivered as commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) products.1 The provider sells the software application to users 
                                                          
∗
 Corresponding author. 
1
 A COTS product is a commercial software application that “is designed to be easily installed 
and to interoperate with existing system components” (see http://whatis.techtarget.com). Al-
most all software bought by the average computer user fits into the COTS category, such as 
operating systems, office product suites, word processing, and e-mail programs. 
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and helps to install it on users’ sites. The users possess the full ownership of the soft-
ware, and must provide IT infrastructure, hardware, and support services in order to 
enable continuous use of the software. 
The SaaS is experiencing fast growth. The AMR Research reports that the on-
demand software market is growing more than 20% a year, compared with single-digit 
growth in traditional software (Lacy 2006). It is expected to reach $10 billion in annual 
revenue by 2009, up from $1.5 billion in 2006 (Pallatto 2006). To many users, the SaaS 
constitutes an attractive alternative to the traditional COTS solution. The recent study by 
InformationWeek indicates that 29% of the 250 business technology pros surveyed were 
using at least one licensed application hosted by a provider and accessed over the Inter-
net, and 35% were planning to buy software that way, or were considering it. More 
interestingly, interest is found not just among small companies. Instead, 55% of the 
respondents have annual revenue of more than $100 million, and a third have more than 
$1 billion in revenue (InformationWeek 2007). Large organizations, such as Ama-
zon.com, Cisco, Sprint, Morgan Stanley, Nokia, and Target, are also attracted by the 
SaaS and choose to obtain their software on demand, although they can easily set up the 
internal system without subjecting to any budget constraint.  It is clear that the SaaS 
providers are stealing market share from the traditional providers of COTS software, 
and putting significant competitive pressure on them (Economist, 2007).  
However, the long-term success of the SaaS in such a competitive setting remains 
uncertain. Data security and reliability as well as application control are always 
among users’ top concerns (Bednarz 2006) which prevent them from opting for this 
new business model. In addition, the multi-tenancy design by the SaaS, under which 
providers are hosting a single instance of the software on a single server and main-
taining the customer data on a single database (Hickins 2007), brings users the  
concern of lack of customization. For example, SourceRad, which provides clinical 
practices with “integrated office scheduling, web-based viewing, online archiving, 
disaster recovery, and transcription, all in an affordable, hassle free hosted plat-
form,” (Author visit with SourceRad team, July 2007), operates a “one-to-many” 
service model, with no customization. As a result, users must exert additional effort to 
make its standard software application fit smoothly with their existing IT systems. 
Although some researchers have already investigated the SaaS, such as Susarla et al. 
(2003) and Cheng and Koehler (2002), they focus on the monopoly setting and exclude 
the existence of COTS software providers as well as their market influence. In this 
study, I look at a marketplace in which the SaaS and COTS software solutions both are 
available. Our analysis focuses on the competition between the two. The model charac-
terizes three salient differences between the SaaS and COTS. First, they deliver different 
products: a customized software application (from the COTS) versus a bundle of stan-
dard software and services (from the SaaS). Second, they adopt distinct pricing modes: 
an outright purchase (the COTS) versus a “per transaction” fee structure (the SaaS). 
Third, they employ different delivery methods: software installed on a user’s in-house 
server (the COTS) versus an interface delivered over the Internet remotely (the SaaS).  
We identify several interesting features of such a competition. First of all, we show 
that pricing its products strategically would allow the SaaS coexist with the COTS in 
the long run. The market will be segmented in such a way that firms with low  
transaction volume opt for the SaaS model because of the cheapness and scalability, 
and firms with high transaction volume prefer the COTS model to enjoy software that 
fits their specific business needs well. Moreover, we find that if users are concerned 
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about potential changes in their future business environment, the SaaS providers 
should increase their prices. By doing this, they give up the competition with the 
COTS provider for high-volume users and instead focus on attracting small and me-
dium firms. In contrast, if users expect the unfit costs of using standard software to 
decrease due to the advance of web technologies, the SaaS providers should reduce 
their prices to compete aggressively with COTS providers for those large corporate 
users. These counter-intuitive yet important findings help to suggest useful competi-
tive pricing strategies to providers of on-demand software. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. 
The analysis of the competition is given by Section 3. Section 4 summarizes our ma-
jor findings, discusses their practical implications, and concludes the paper. 
2   The Model 
There are three parties in the market: software users, the COTS provider, and the 
SaaS provider.  
Software users have different IT needs, which are measured by the expected vol-
ume of software use. Users who use the software application more frequently (in 
expectation) are considered with larger IT needs. To capture this heterogeneity, we 
assume users are uniformly distributed on a unit-length line normalized from 0 to 1. 
The location of a user on this line represents its expected transaction volume (in terms 
of the number of transactions). In addition, we assume that each user’s actual transac-
tion volume is stochastic. The user only knows the demand distribution, but not the 
exact number of transactions needed. In light of this, the actual demand for software 
use for each user i is modeled as a random variable uniformly distributed on 
[ ]θθ +− ii dd , , where the parameter id  represents his expected number of transac-
tions and θ  measures the volatility of the actual transaction volume. Note that id  
itself is a random number distributed from 0 to 1.  
The COTS provider sells the packaged software application to users and charges a 
one-time upfront fee. The source code of the application will be modified to fit the 
user’s specific business needs, and thus the COTS in-house system is well custom-
ized. The provider bears an operating cost C  to serve one user and receives a one-
time payment P from the user. The user needs to install hardware and infrastructures, 
hire IT staff, and organize an internal IT group to provide software maintenance, data 
backups, and security and capacity management. Such service costs associated with 
each use of the software are denoted by c (i.e., the service costs per transaction). Each 
transaction creates a value of u to the user. 
The SaaS provider sells the bundle of software and services on demand. The cost 
structure faced by the SaaS provider has two components: a setup cost S per user (the 
fixed part) and a service cost c per transaction (the variable part). Users pay as they 
go, incurring a payment ap  per transaction to the provider. The software is installed 
on a central location which is controlled by the provider. All users can access and run 
it remotely via the Internet. To any individual user, the application is not  
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well-customized, and each transaction gives the user a total value of u-t. The parame-
ter t measures the user’s disutility from not using its ideal product and is called users’ 
unfit costs in this paper. In many cases, it also represents the cost of extra effort to 
make the outside application work with the user’s existing IT components smoothly.  
Competition goes as follows. The two software providers are competing on prices. 
They set their respective prices simultaneously to maximize profit by considering the 
other’s responses. Given the prices, users choose one provider or just stay out of the 
market by comparing the costs and benefits of using each provider. 
3   Competition Analysis 
In what follows, we analyze three different competition scenarios and then compare 
the pricing strategies under each. Section 3.1 first studies the providers’ prices in a 
static competition. It will be used as a benchmark case. Then we discuss the essence 
of competition in a longer time window with possible dynamic changes in unfit costs, 
which could increase or decrease for some practical reasons. Section 3.2 and 3.3 study 
each of the two changes respectively and compare the findings to the benchmark case.  
3.1   Pricing Strategy in the Static Competition (The Benchmark Case) 
Consider user i with expected transaction volume id . Denote its actually transaction 
volume by iD . If the user opts for COTS which charges a one-time payment P , it 
needs first to decide and install proper IT service capacity level iq  internally, which 
is obtained by maximizing the user’s expected utility:  
{ }[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) [ ] iiiiiiiiii
q
cqPqDDEquFqFuqcqPqDuEMax
i
−−<+−=−− /1,min   
where (.)F  is the cumulative density function of the transaction volume for user i.  
With probability ( )iqF−1 , the actual transaction volume will be larger than the 
user’s pre-installed service capacity. The user loses excess demand. With probabil-
ity ( )iqF , the actual transaction volume will be smaller than the user’s service capac-
ity. The user incurs the costs of carrying excess capacity. Solving the optimization 
problem gives a closed form solution ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+=
u
cdq ii
21* θ . Hence, the expected 
utility for a COTS user is θ
u
cucPcudi
)()( −−−− .2 On the other hand, if the user 
opts for the SaaS, it gains an expected utility of ia dtpu )( −− .  
                                                          
2
 To understand this expression: the first term is the expected value from using the software; the 
second term is the user’s one-time payment to the provider; and the last term represents the 
user’s loss due to transaction uncertainty. Detailed derivations are available upon requests.  
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It is easy to see that in equilibrium the market is segmented in such a way that us-
ers with low transaction volume choose the SaaS and users with high transaction 
volume choose the COTS software, and the indifferent user has the expected transac-
tion volume of 
)(
)(*
ctpu
cuc
tcp
Pd
aa −+
−
+
+−
=
θ
. Hence, the COTS provider serves 
users in [ ]1,*d , with a market share of *1 d− , and the SaaS serves users in [ ]*,0 d , 
with a market share of *d .  
The two providers choose prices P  and ap  to maximize respective profit as fol-
lows: )1)(( *dCPMax
P
−−
and ( )( ) *2*
2
1 SddcpMax apa
−−
. 
The equilibrium price pair is characterized in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. In the static competition, the price equilibrium exists. There is a 
threshold value *t for the unfit cost parameter.  
a) When 
2
* cut
−≤  , the equilibrium prices are given by equations (1) and (2).   
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b) When *tt ≥ , the equilibrium prices are ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
+= tu
u
ccucuCpP a ,2
)(
22
,
** θ . 
Proposition 1 describes the software providers’ pricing strategy in a static competi-
tion. It is noticeable that the unfit cost parameter plays an important role. Whether or 
not it exceeds the given threshold value *t defines distinct pricing strategy. When 
such threshold value *t  is not reached yet, both providers’ prices are increasing in the 
unfit cost but the SaaS’ price is capped at tu − . When the unfit cost exceeds *t , the 
SaaS charges tu − , the upper limit of the price which could attract users and leaves 
zero consumer surplus.3  
In practice, however, unfit costs could change. Unfit costs could grow over time, 
given software or hardware changes on the users’ side, or decrease over time due to 
technology improvements. For example, if the SaaS uses a browser interface that is 
dependent on nonstandard aspects of IE7 but business circumstances faced by users 
drive a demand for the latest IE or Firefox, or if the SaaS’s interface involves a mod-
ule built on top of a program that only works in a pre-Vista MS Windows environ-
ment but hardware replacement at the user’s site leads to multiple PCs with the Vista 
OS, unfit costs may increase. On the other hand, if the SaaS provider continuously 
                                                          
3
 At this price upper limit u-t, the SaaS provider extracts all consumer surpluses. Any price 
higher this upper limit will drive users to be out of the market.  
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invests in improving its system integration features, users’ unfit costs may be decreas-
ing over time. For instance, Salesforce.com developed and launched AppExchange in 
January 2006. AppExchange is an online marketplace for on-demand business soft-
ware. Currently it includes over 150 applications, and Adobe, Skype, and Factiva are 
among the various partners. AppExchange allows Salesforce.com and other on de-
mand software providers to integrate their applications and therefore promises soft-
ware users seamless extension of their existing systems (Cowley 2005; Kuchinskas 
2006). In this case, users expect to have reduced unfit costs because a uniform plat-
form eases collaboration across applications. Considering such changing natures of 
the market, we need a two-stage model to capture the essence of competition in a 
longer time window with possible dynamic changes in unfit costs. In the first stage, 
the vendors choose their prices ( ), Ppa  simultaneously, which are assumed un-
changeable in the time line we are studying. The SaaS imposes unfit costs 1t  in the 
first stage. Users could have certain expectations about a future change in unfit costs: 
users may expect unfit costs to increase if they anticipate changes in demand or hard-
ware upgrades, or to decrease if they anticipate technological advances that favor the 
shared software business model. In the second stage, such a change is realized. Users 
will then consider switching. We make two simplifying assumptions for model tracta-
bility. First, users and software providers weight utilities and profits obtained from 
both stages equally. Second, the initial setup costs of the SaaS to serve a new client 
are negligible. These two assumptions help to ease the analytical exposition without 
changing the results qualitatively.  
3.2   The Two-Stage Model with Increased Unfit Costs 
Consider the scenario that the initial unfit cost is 1t  while users expect such cost to 
increase to Ht  later. Figure 1 depicts this two-stage competition. In the first stage, 
with an unfit cost 1t , users in [ ]1,0 d  choose the SaaS, and users in [ ]1,1d  opt for the 
COTS software. The user 1d  should be indifferent between the two choices. In the 
second stage, with an increased unfit cost 1ttH > , SaaS users in [ ]1,ddS  switch to 
the COTS system for a better fit while the rest stay with their initial choices. The 
“marginal” switcher is given by 
)(
)(
ctpu
cuc
ctp
Pd
HaHa
S
−+
−
+
−+
=
θ
.
4
 On the other 
hand, the user 1d , since it is indifferent between the two providers in the first stage, 
gains the same total utility from both. If it chooses the SaaS and switches to the COTS 
later, its total utility is { } ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −
−−−+−−
u
cucPdcudtpu a
θ)()()( 111 ; if it chooses 
 
                                                          
4
 An existing SaaS user i compares the utility from the SaaS, 
iHa dtpu )( −− , with the utility 
from the COTS, 
u
cucPdcu i
θ)()( −−−− , to decide whether to switch. Therefore, the marginal 
switcher is the one who gets same utility from both providers. 
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1dSd
Users choose the SaaS
initially and stay with it
afterward.
Users choose the SaaS
initially and switch to the
COTS in the second stage
Users choose the
COTS vendor initially
and stay it afterward.
1
0
 
Fig. 1. Competition with Increased Unfit Costs 
the COTS initially, it obtains 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −
−−+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −
−−−
u
cucdcu
u
cucPdcu θθ )()()()( 11 . 
By equating these two utilities, we get:  
 
)(
)(
1
1
ctpu
cucd
a −+
−
=
θ
.                                               (3) 
The COTS provider gets ]1,[ 1d  users in the first stage and ],[ 1ddS users in the 
second stage. Its profit comes from users’ one-time payment. The SaaS provider 
serves ],0[ 1d  users in the first stage and ],0[ Sd  users in the second stage. It gains 
profit from users’ every use of the software. Their prices are determined as follows.   
 
[ ]S
P
dCPMax −− 1)( .    (4) 
 
( ) ( ) )(
2
1 22
1
00
1
Sa
dd
ap
ddcpxdxxdxcpMax
S
a
+−=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+− ∫∫ .  (5)
  
Let 
Htta
p
,1
 and 
Htt
P
,1
 be the equilibrium prices in such a two-stage competition 
and let 
Htt
d
,
1
1
 be the indifferent user defined by equation (3). Let 
1ta
p  and 
1t
P  be 
the equilibrium prices in the static competition with unfit costs 1t , i.e., the prices in 
the benchmark case, and *
1t
d  be the indifferent user in that case. 
 
Proposition 2. When users anticipate a future increase in unfit costs, Htt →1 , both 
vendors will increase their prices; i.e., 
11, tatta
pp
H
> , and 
11, ttt
PP
H
> . More users 
will choose the COTS software initially, i.e., *
,
1 11 ttt
dd
H
< ,, and the SaaS will lose 
existing clients to the COTS provider once the cost increase occurs. 
 
Proposition 2 states three important findings. First, although increased unfit costs 
imply a decrease in the quality of the SaaS product ( tu − ), the on demand software 
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provider should nevertheless increase its price: 
11, tatta
pp
H
> . By charging a high 
price, the provider gives up competing for high-volume users with the COTS pro-
vider; it instead concentrates on exploiting low-volume users that are unable to afford 
the COTS anyway. Second, the COTS provider also raises its price, which is intuitive 
because its product becomes more attractive. Interestingly, we find that the COTS 
provider’s pricing function (
u
cucCctpP Ha
2
)(
22
θ−
−+
−+
= , equation (1)) is the 
same as that in a static competition with Htt = . This means that the COTS provider 
should adopt a simple pricing strategy. Software is priced as if it were in a one-stage 
competition with invariant unfit costs. Finally, we conclude that a belief that unfit 
costs will increase benefits in-house solution providers but hurts the SaaS providers. 
3.3   The Two-Stage Model with Decreased Unfit Costs 
Figure 2 shows the two-stage competition when t decreases. In the first stage, with 
unfit costs 1t , users in [ ]1,0 d  choose the SaaS, and users in [ ]1,1d  buy the COTS. 
The indifferent user is at 1d . In the second stage, the unfit cost decreases to 1ttL < , 
which could be the result of web technology improvements, adoption of software 
standards and protocols, or creation of a uniform software platform. In such cases, 
existing COTS users compare their utility from switching to the SaaS, 
iLa dtpu )( −− , and staying with the COTS, 
u
cucdcu i
θ)()( −−− . The “marginal” 
switcher, Sd , is the one who gains the same utility from these two options: 
)(
)(
ctpu
cucd
La
S
−+
−
=
θ
. 
The indifferent user 1d  can be found as follows. If this user chooses the COTS and 
then switches to the SaaS later, its expected total utility is 
{ }11 )()()( dtpu
u
cucPdcu La −−+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −
−−−
θ
; if it chooses the SaaS in the first 
stage, its total utility is { } { }111 )()( dtpudtpu Laa −−+−− . By equating both, we get  
)(
)(
11
1
ctpu
cuc
ctp
Pd
aa −+
−
+
−+
=
θ
.                   (6) 
Note that the number of switchers (from the COTS to SaaS) is not affected by the 
COTS price because it is considered a sunk cost at the second stage.  
The COTS and SaaS providers choose profit-maximizing prices respectively, as 
described by equations (4) and (5).  
Let 
Ltta
p
,1
 and 
Ltt
P
,1
 be the prices of the SaaS and COTS products, and let 
Ltt
d
,1 1
 be the indifferent user defined by equation (6).  
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Fig. 2. Competition with decreased unfit costs 
Proposition 3. When users anticipate a decrease in unfit costs, Ltt →1 , both provid-
ers will reduce their prices; i.e.,
11 , tatta
pp
L
< , and 
11 , ttt
PP
L
< . More users will 
choose the SaaS initially; i.e., *
,
1 11 ttt
dd
L
> . Existing clients of the COTS provider 
have little incentive to switch to the on-demand software even if unfit costs decrease, 
but they may do so if transaction volatility is high. 
 
Three important findings are stated in Proposition 3. First, the SaaS provider’s re-
sponse to the expected decrease in unfit costs, which represents an increase in the 
quality of its product, is to reduce its price. The increased quality and reduced price 
together put the SaaS in a much better position in the competition with the COTS 
provider to gain high-volume users, who are much more profitable in the eyes of the 
SaaS.5 Second, the COTS provider once again will stick to a simple pricing strategy. 
Its pricing function,
u
cucCctpP a
2
)(
22
1 θ−
−+
−+
=  (Equation (1)), is the same as 
that in a static competition with unfit costs 1tt = . It therefore can just ignore the 
expected future changes and price its software as if in a one-stage competition. Third, 
existing users of COTS software are unlikely to switch to the on-demand software. 
These users have two choices: stay with the COTS solution, with a utility of 
u
cucdcu i
θ)()( −−− , or switch, with a utility of iLa dtpu )( −− . Since cpa >  
always, the user switches only if its transaction volatility (θ ) is high. Hence, we 
conclude that once an in-house system has been installed, users have little incentive to 
switch to the SaaS unless they need to manage risks caused by volatile demand. 
4   Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we try to shed light on the pricing strategy of the SaaS providers in the 
competition with the traditional COTS software providers. We examine the equilib-
rium prices in both static and dynamic market conditions where users face stochastic 
demand. Our findings show that the SaaS on-demand model is superior when a user 
faces low transaction volume and/or high transaction volatility. It offers small firms 
                                                          
5
 The SaaS gets paid per transaction. So high-transaction-volume users are more profitable than 
low-transaction-volume users. 
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cost-saving access to software and becomes the natural choices of them, and mean-
while it competes with the COTS solution on firms with large transaction volume.  
One common belief in designing the SaaS software is that increasing the product 
quality by reducing its unfit cost should support higher prices. Hence, some results 
from our two-period analysis may seem counter-intuitive at first glance. We establish 
that the SaaS provider’s optimal response to users’ anticipation of decreased unfit 
costs (which means an increase in product quality) is to reduce its price. The SaaS is 
more competitive in this situation and thus can go after the more profitable high-
volume users. Since the SaaS provider is paid on a per transaction basis, users with 
high transaction volumes are considered more profitable. Although the provider gains 
smaller revenue per transaction (due to the reduction in its unit price), its market share 
expands to encompass part of the segment with larger transaction volume. On the 
other hand, when users anticipate a future increase in unfit costs (which means a de-
crease in the quality of the SaaS product), the on-demand software provider should 
increase its price. By charging a higher price, it gives up competing against the COTS 
provider for high-volume users. Instead, it separates the market and concentrates on 
exploiting low-volume users that are unable to afford the COTS anyway.  
Although this work only focuses on analyzing the SaaS providers’ pricing strategy in 
the competitive market, there are many possibilities for further SaaS studies. It would be 
interesting to examine the role of differential service level agreements (SLAs). When 
users have demand for different levels of service, the SLA constitutes a way to segment 
the market and improve the SaaS’s profit. Another possible extension encompasses the 
design and management of a dual channel. Certain vendors (such as Oracle and IBM) 
have changed their business models to offer both COTS and SaaS products. Typically, 
they are selling a sophisticated version of their software products as a COTS product 
and are leasing simplified operating versions as the SaaS. Future research may investi-
gate the proper pricing and functionality bundle per channel.  
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